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THE NEW ANTITRUST POLICY AND THE
INDIVIDUAL BUSINESS FIRMt
JESSE W. MARKHAM*
Probably the most dramatic change of the postwar period in the institutional
environment of the business firm is the renewed vigor and vigilance that has been
injected into antitrust policy. The change is dramatic in part because it was un-
expected: Our federal antitrust policy is our nation's oldest economic policy expressed
in public law; the Sherman Act' celebrates its 75th anniversary in this year of 1965,
its enactment antedating the Federal Reserve Act2 by nearly a quarter century and
the 1946 Employment Act3 by well over a half century; throughout much of its
history it has scarcely affected the basic practices of business. The trust-busting days
of President Theodore Roosevelt, and later of Thurman Arnold, differed from the
decade of virtual antitrust suspension in the 1920S only in the sense that in the former
more-but not a great many more-near-monopolies were prosecuted. Accordingly,
the business community, the legal profession, economists, even the antitrust agencies
themselves, could with reasonable safety assume that antitrust policy now and in the
foreseeable future would be approximately what it always had been, a loose prohibi-
tion on the possession of-or, more accurately, the flagrant abuse of-undisputed
monopoly power and a tight prohibition on price-fixing and related agreements
among competitors.
This prohibition left open broad avenues of corporate growth. Until the i94os
and the Alcoa decision4 there existed virtually no antitrust constraint on internal
growth. The firm could not, of course, grow by illegal means such as predatory or
discriminatory pricing or other unfair methods of competition, but there was no
bar to firm growth by means considered "honestly industrial." Antitrust policy also
permitted almost all growth by acquisition short of creating a virtual monopoly; the
doctrine enunciated in US. Steel5 that "mere size is no offense" not only left the
permissible limits of growth by merger at least as high as sixty per cent of the
market, it provided an opening for the building of large organizations through the
t Some of the material contained in this essay was presented before the Princeton University-Brookings
Institution Round Table on Business-Government Relations, April 17, 1965. The revised essay benefited
from the comments of the Round Table participants.
* A.B. 1941, University of Richmond; M.A. x947, Ph.D. 1949, Harvard University. Professor of
Economics, Princeton University. Formerly Chief Economist, Federal Trade Commission. Visiting Ford
Foundation Professor at the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, 1965-66. Author,
THe AmERICAN EcONOMY (z963). Contributor of articles to economics journals.
'26 Stat. 209 (i89o), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964).
2 38 Stat. 251 (1913), 12 U.S.C. § 226 (1964).
8 6o Stat. 23, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1021-24 (1964).
'United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
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conglomerate merger of firms already in possession of larger market shares.' With
the Sherman Act prohibiting only a few of the most obvious consolidations for
monopoly and the Clayton Act7 applicable only to stock acquisitions, firms could
grow at will through asset acquisitions and were not seriously limited in their
growth through stock acquisitions.
In the predominantly private enterprise market economy of the United States,
growth in the economy has been synonymous with business firm growth, both in
numbers and in size but principally in size. In the United States the number of
firms has shown a remarkable tendency to grow in proportion to the population. In
1929 there were twenty-five business firms per i,ooo population, in 1964 there were
25.4. Between 1929 and 1964 while the population was increasing by fifty-seven per
cent the number of business firms increased by fifty-nine per cent, but over the same
period the Gross National Product (in constant dollars) increased by 187 per cent
and per capita GNP nearly doubled. Since per capita GNP doubled while the
number of firms per capita remained virtually unchanged, the GNP per firm must
have doubled.
This growth in GNP generated per firm can be attributed to the related factors
of rising productivity and growth in the size of the average firm through both in-
ternal expansion and acquisition. Unfortunately, very little is known about the
causal relationship between the growth in GNP and firm size. Conceivably, had
firms not doubled their size they may have doubled in number and in this way also
have doubled real GNP. Any conclusions on this issue would be highly speculative.
The point emphasized here, however, is that growth of the economy in real terms
has, in the past, been associated with growth in size of firm.
Moreover, in the process of growing, at least since the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury, the largest firms individually have tended to grow at a greatly disparate rate,
although as a group they have tended to grow in rough proportion to the over-all
economy. The work of A. D. H. Kaplan has shown that considerable turnover in
rank occurs among the top fifty and the top ioo largest American corporations8 For
example, of the largest fifty industrial corporations in i9o9 only thirteen appeared
among the largest fifty in i9g6o; less than half (twenty-four) of the initial fifty even
appeared among the largest ioo. Those few that remained among the largest fifty
or largest ioo had, of course, experienced large promotions or demotions in rank.
In fact, while much emphasis has been given to the stability of big business in the
American economy, only two corporations, United States Steel Corporation and
Standard Oil Company of New Jersey (in spite of the latter's major dissolution in
i9 II), have had a long tenure near the top of the list of the largest industrial
corporations. °
I United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693 (1927).
Ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 731 (1914).
' BIG ENTERPRISE IN A COMPETITIVE SYsEM 5 (rev. ed. 1963).
8 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. I (19 1),
10 Between x9o9 and I96o U.S. Steel's rank gradually declincd from first to third, while Standard
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While the role mergers have played in company growth, and in the disparate
rates of growth among individual firms, is subject to some controversy, there is
general agreement that it has been significant. One of the few extensive quantitative
studies in this area shows that about eighty large corporations owe from one-third
to one-quarter of their size to past mergers and acquisitions;" one distinguished and
highly reputable economist in reviewing the study offered persuasive reasons for
concluding that the fraction is significantly higher and that "merger has been the
basic method by which individual firms have acquired high shares in major in-
dustries in the United States.' 12
Against this background the "new" antitrust policy adds up to a dramatic change
in the permissible means of firm growth. The most significant aspects of the new
policy are (I) the rapidity with which it has been expanded to encompass business
practices heretofore assumed to be the normal and natural modes of business conduct,
and (2) the greatly increased vigor with which it has been administered against
practices nominally considered of questionable legality but for the most part seldom
challenged. Moreover, the new policy, viewed prospectively, has a completely new
ingredient. At the same time that both old and recently amended statutes are being
administered far more vigorously than at any previous period in history, a con-
comitant of which is the emergence of several new judicial doctrines every year,
congressional committees are introducing new and decidedly more proscriptive legis-
lation in each session of Congress.
Any complete assessment of the impact of antitrust policy on the individual
business firm must give consideration to some of these possible new legislative con-
straints on business conduct as well as the doctrines already laid down in the recent
decisions of the Federal Trade Commission and the courts. Even in the unlikely
event that none of the bills now pending becomes law, they may very possibly affect
the scope and volume of cases brought under existing statutes.
I
THE STATISTICAL EVIDENCE OF INTENSIFIED ANTITRUST
While I agree with the statement frequently made by Edward F. Howrey, while
he was Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, that stark numbers are a
fatuous means of describing our antitrust policy, trends and sudden changes in such
numbers are revealing. The data in table one are indicative of the intensified pace
of antitrust in recent years. In the three immediate postwar years 1945-48 the annual
average number of antitrust cases of all kinds initiated by both antitrust agencies
and private parties amounted to 196. For the three-year period 1959-62 the annual
Oil (New Jersey) rose from second to first. DuPont, only thirtieth on the I9O9 list, ranked eighth in
196o, and seven of the top ten in 596o did not appear on the list of the largest fifty in i9o9. Some, e.g.,
General Motors, had not been founded as early as i9o9.
1 J. F. WSrON, THE ROLE OF MERGERS IN THE GROWTH OF LARGE FiRMs (1953).
" Stigler, The Statistics of Monopoly and Merger, 64 J. POL. EcON. 33, 40 (1956).
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TABLE i
ANTITRUST CASES INITIATED
Annual Average Annual Average
Initated by 1945-1948 1959-1062
Department of Justice ............................. 36 78
Federal Trade Commission ......................... 100 600




THE VOLUME AND DISPOSITION OF MERGER CASES INITIATED BY THE DEPARTMENT OP JUSTICE
AND THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, 1914-1950 AND 1951-I964
Department of Justice Federal Trade Commission
Action 1914-1950 1951-1964 1914-1950 1951-1964
Total cases initiated .................. 200) 87 59 53
Dismissed( ......................... 10 17 48 7
Orders of divestiture .................. 10( 400) 11 37'
Divestiture orders appealed ............ - 7 8 14
Affirmed ......................... - 6 2 4
Reversed, modified, or set aside ..... - - 6 2
Remanded ........................ - - 2
Appeal pending ................... - 1 - 6
Initial decision pending ............... - 30 - 9
(1) Includes several cases dismissed by the trial court but on appeal to the Supreme Court.
(2) In 15 of the 20 cases section 7 charges supplemented charges under the Sherman Act or other
antitrust statutes.
(3) 8 by consent decrees; 2 by court order after trial.
(4) 49 of the 77 divestitures were obtained through consent orders or decrees; 27 by the Department
of Justice and 22 by the Federal Trade Commission.
Source: Neither the Federal Trade Commission nor the Department of Justice publishes periodic tabulations of antitrust ease and their
status before the Commuiion and the courts. I am indebted to Dr. Betty Beck of the Nationl Industrial Conferencs Board for data
making this tabulation possible. Dr. Boek's sources were the mimeographed copies of complaints issaed by the Justice Department and
the Federal Trade Commission, and the CCH T ADE REGULITON REPORTER. While thesn data are not official, they are bcllevcd
to be up to date and reasonably complete and accurate.
average number of cases had jumped to 1,o56, or nearly five and one-half times the
pre-1949 figure. The largest increases occurred in Federal Trade Commission
and private cases, both having registered at least a sixfold increase over the earlier
period. Much of the increase in FTC cases is accounted for by the rising volume
of Robinson-Patman Act cases, from an annual average of about thirty to an average
of nearly 20o between 1945-48 and 1959-62, and of unfair competition cases under
section 5 of the FTC Act.
In terms of substantive effect on the individual firm, however, the increased
volume and broadened scope of merger cases are by far the most important in-
gredient of the new antitrust policy (table two). Between 1952 and December 31,
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1964, the Justice Department and the FTC initiated a total of 143 cases, nearly twice
the number initiated throughout the entire thirty-six-year period 1914-5o. The
average number of merger cases initiated per year has risen from about two to
twelve. The antitrust agencies, in sharp contrast with the pre-1950 period, have
won the overwhelming majority of their cases, and so far have not lost a single
decision in the Supreme Court. It is this last fact, laid against the backdrop of a
wide variety of novel theories of competitive injury through merger, that significantly
affects the present climate in which the individual firm operates.
A more bizarre but substantively less important aspect of the more intensified
antitrust policy is the apparently successful assault being made on secret price-fixing
agreements. The public, and especially the business community, will not soon forget
the headlined jail sentences imposed in the electrical equipment case. The Justice
Department has initiated criminal and civil cases against the West Coast producers
of concrete and steel pipe alleging a similar price conspiracy and has cases pending
against many of the important steel product lines, such as carbon sheet and steel
plates, and against manufacturers of drugs and milled flour. In a case against kosher
meat processors selling in the New York metropolitan area the jury, on January 26,
1965, voted for acquittal, but a civil case is still pending.
While these cases, in view of the long-established per se illegality of price-fixing
agreements, add no new dimensions to antitrust policy, they are additional evidence
of the increased vigor with which the antitrust statutes are now being administered.
And the imposition of jail sentences along with the tenfold increase in maximum fines
effective since the 1955 Sherman Act amendment13 has made a price-fixing arrange-
ment something more than a sporting venture which, if lost, could be financed out of
petty cash.
The "new" antitrust policy sketched above has received considerable attention
from the business community. It has been prominently placed on the last two pro-
grams of the American Bar Association and the last several meetings of the ABA's
Section on Antitrust. It has been the topic for four National Industrial Conference
Board Special Conferences 4 and is currently being considered among the most
likely economic issues to which the Committee for Economic Development will
address one of its forthcoming policy statements. Obviously, any development in
the business scene accorded such unprecedented attention merits close and detailed
scrutiny.
" 69 Stat. 282 (1955), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1964).
"' The importance the NICB accords the topic is indicated by President H. Bruce Palmers introductory
statement at the Conference on Antitrust in an Expanding Economy: "Existing antitrust legislation, con-
gressional investigations into antitrust matters, and policies and programs of the federal antitrust enforce-
ment agencies have multiplied to the point where they affect virtually every industry and every com-
pany." NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, THE InP'ACT OF ANTrTRUST ON ECONOMIC GROWTH:
TRANSCRIPT OF SPECIAL CONFERENCE (March 1965).
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II
THE SPECIFIC COMPONENTS OF THE NEw ANTITRUST POLICY
As pointed out earlier, the recently invigorated antitrust policy can be broadly
,broken down into two components: (I) the more effective prosecution of business
practices and activities the laws have long prohibited, such as price-fixing agreements
and monopolization, and (2) the propagation of essentially new doctrines that now
constrain firms from doing what they heretofore could do with impunity and had
come to view as "normal" business conduct. It is this latter component that has
attracted the greatest attention and generated the most controversy.
. In precise terms, what are the once "normal" business practices the new anti-
trust policy now prohibits? While the individual decisions cover a wide variety of
business situations each of which in some respect differs from the others, taken
together they reflect the Government's serious concern over the large size of corpora-
tions making up the business community and what the Government appears to
regard as a corollary, a serious concern over preserving the existing population of
small business enterprises. The legality of a business activity is, as will be shown
below, no longer determined solely on the basis of its competitive effects-the
traditional standard-but may be determined on the basis of how it affects the
number, size, and immediate and prospective opportunities of small firms which may
be in actual or potential competition with the larger firms involved in the case.' 5
The component of the new antitrust policy is most clearly seen in some of the
"recent merger decisions. In the Brown Shoe case, 6 the Supreme Court held the
merger of Brown Shoe, the fourth largest shoe manufacturer with four per cent
of total shoe production, and Kinney (the desired acquisition), a large family-style
shoe retail chain accounting for 1.6 per cent of retail shoe sales, to be illegal on the
grounds that (I) "numerous independent retailers" would be disadvantaged through
the economies of production, distribution, and style alterations that strong national
chains could effect, and (2) independent shoe manufacturers would be foreclosed
,from Kinney stores as outlets for their shoes. These particulars were not as im-
portant, however, as Chief Justice Warren's statement of what he thought to be the
broad purpose of section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended:17
The dominant theme pervading congressional consideration of the 195o amendments
was a fear of what was considered to be a rising tide of economic concentration
in the American economy.... Other considerations cited in support of the bill
were the desirability of retaining "local control" over industry and the protection
of small businesses' i8
"'Several staff members of the Federal Trade Commission disagree with this broad interpretation
of recent decisions, and argue that the protection of small business has not in fact become a consideration.
The language used in the decisions cited herein is ambiguous, but the concern with preserving small
business is scarcely arguable.
' United States v. Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
' 64 Star. 1125 (95o), 15 U.S.C. § x8 (x964).
s 370 U.S. at 315-16.
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One of the very important problems recent merger decisions create for business
firms are the multiple and conflicting standards they lay down. Chief Justice
Warren, continuing in Brown Shoe, asserted,
It is competition, not competitors, which the [Clayton] Act protects. But we
cannot fail to recognize Congress' desire to promote competition through the
protection of viable, small, locally owned businesses. Congress appreciated that
occasional higher costs and prices might result from the maintenance of fragmented
industries and markets. It resolved these competing considerations in favor of
decentralization."9
As two veteran students of antitrust have remarked,
No matter how many times you read it, that passage states: Although mergers
are not rendered unlawful by the mere fact that small independent stores may be
adversely affected, we must recognize that mergers are unlawful when small
independent stores may be adversely affected. 20
The decision-making bodies of large business firms may be justifiably perplexed
over just exactly what the language of Brown Shoe permits and what it prohibits,
but they can scarcely be in doubt as to what the ultimate decision in fact was: A
merger that might disadvantage small independent shoe manufacturers or retailers;
even if it leads to lower prices and lower costs, violates section 7-
The Federal Trade Commission declared Procter & Gamble's acquisition of
Clorox to be in contravention of Clayton Act section 7 on the grounds that the
combination, with Procter & Gamble's great advertising and capital resources behind
the established name of Clorox, would increase its share of the liquid bleach market
at the expense of the numerous small liquid bleach producers.2'
The Federal Trade Commission decided the Foremost Dairies case2 2 on similar
grounds. In ordering Foremost to divest itself of dairies it had acquired in ten
particular local markets the Commission noted that section 7 "was designed to
prevent one company or a group of companies from using mergers to distort
irrevocably market structures in small business industries. '2  Early in its opinion
the Commission conceded that many factors-technological changes, new public
health standards, the bonding of milk plants, federal and state market orders, the
advantages of "hedging" through expansion into new geographical areas and product
lines-all favored the large processor and added up to strong economic incentives
for existing firms to grow in size, even to grow by merger. But these market in.
centives to grow were subject to the constraining forces of section 7, and these forces
were directed toward the preservation of small business.
0 Id. at 344.
"0 Bork & Bowman, The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 COLuM. L. REV. 363, 373 (1965).
2" Procter & Gamble Co., 3 TRADa REG. RP. x6673 (FTC I963).
" Foremost Dairies, Inc., 6o F.T.C. 944 (1962).231d. at 1050.
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A number of recent cases reiterate the doctrine laid down in Brown Shoe,
Procter & Gamble, and Foremost Dairies. Significantly, this doctrine seems to rest
far more on the statements of individual senators and congressmen made in the
course of floor debates on the Celler-Kefauver Amendment, and on those contained
in various reports and studies cited by participants in the debates, than on the
language of amended section 7 itself as finally enacted. It is not surprising that
more than a modest sprinkling of these statements extol the social beneficence of
decentralized industry under "local" ownership, ie., small business, and that the
actual and potential maleficence of industrial concentration, absentee ownership, and
oligopoly are all easily equated with big business. Hence, once the Court has
accorded such statements the status of competent authority, it has been a relatively
easy matter to recompose section 7 as enacted into the less restrictive language of
the floor debates.
There has thus emerged the doctrine that even though a given merger may not
have demonstrably been shown to have the probable effect of substantially lessening
competition, it may by some "ultimate reckoning of social or economic debits and
credits" be injurious to "social" competition, to be distinguished from "market"
competition.24 In two even more recent cases decided by the Supreme Court section
7 was extended in scope to areas hitherto regarded as beyond its reach, as the Court
turned aside the "ultimate reckoning" doctrine when made by the defense. In the
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank case25 the Court extended the jurisdiction of section 7 to
include commercial banking. In doing so it also laid down the doctrine that even
though a merger might possibly produce a net increase in competition when all
markets were considered, it was nevertheless illegal if it tended to lessen competition
in one of the relevant markets, sub-markets, or lines of commerce. As Justice Bren-
nan put it,25
We are clear, however, that a merger the effect of which "may be substantially
to lessen competition" is not saved because, on some ultimate reckoning of social or
economic debits and credits, it may be deemed beneficial. A value choice of such
magnitude is beyond the ordinary limits of judicial competence ....
It would seem reasonably clear that the Court could find a merger bringing
together thirty per cent of a relevant market in contravention of section 7 without
referral to the ultimate reckoning doctrine at all. In rejecting it as an inappropriate
standard after having resorted to it frequently in immediately preceding cases to
support judgments denouncing the merger at hand, and less than a year later going
" The distinction between the two has been drawn most clearly by James F. Rill, in an as yet un-
published manuscript on "Current Antitrust Law Background."
"United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
AId. at 371.
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a long way toward returning to it again in Continental Can,7F the Court has greatly
enlarged the area of potential illegality while substantially reducing the acquiring
firm's means of defense. In the recent Penn-Olin case,28 the Court extended section 7
to internal growth when accomplished through the instrument of a joint venture.
The joint construction of a sodium chlorate plant by Pennsalt Chemical and Olin
Mathieson would have been illegal if it had been shown that either joint venturer
would have entered the new market independently if the joint venture had not been
formed.29
The recently enunciated doctrines are not limited to Clayton Act section 7 de-
cisions since these decisions have undoubtedly affected those rendered under the
Sherman Act. In United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Lexington, 0 the Supreme
Court found that the merger of two competing banks was itself a violation of section
i of the Sherman Act. Indeed, the majority opinion of Justice Douglas goes a long
way toward making such mergers per se illegal and having about the same legal
status as price-fixing agreements. And in cases brought against American Optical
Company and Bausch & Lomb, Inc.,"1 the Government is entering a prayer that
each of the defendants be required to divest itself of all their more than 400 wholesale
branches throughout the country and perpetually enjoined from engaging in whole-
saling or in business as dispensing opticians. The argument is that these channels
of commerce are now "foreclosed" from the independent manufacturers of lenses,
frames, and other ophthalmic materials and equipment and that defendants have a
competitive advantage over the more than 6oo independent wholesale laboratories.
The contrast between these recent antitrust doctrines and that laid down by the
Court in the Columbia Steel case32 is striking. In that case the Court held that it
could not forbid U.S. Steel from accomplishing through acquisition that which it
could clearly accomplish legally through internal expansion. The recently enunciated
section 7 and Sherman Act doctrines have completely overturned the Columbia
doctrine. It is equally obvious that they have completely demolished what the Alcoa
decision may possibly have left of the US. Steel doctrine that "mere size is no
offense."
" United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964). As Justice Harlan warned in his
dissent (id. at 476):
"It [the Court] chooses . . . to invent a line of commerce the existence of which no one,
not even the Government, has imagined; for which businessmen and economists will look in
vain; a line of commerce which sprang into existence only when the merger took place and
will cease to exist when the merger is undone. I have no idea where § 7 goes from here, nor
will businessmen or the antitrust bar."
"s United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
21 United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1965 Trade Cas.) 71571 (D. Del.,
Oct. 12, z965).
376 U.S. 665 (1964).
o United States v. American Optical Co., Civil No. 62-C-o6, N.D. Ill., filed Dec. 29, ig6i.
11 United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
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What current antitrust law administration is leaving relatively untouched-
existing size and market power-has come in for proposed radical remedial action
in the form of bills introduced in Congress. In the Eighty-seventh Congress, Con-
gressman Celler introduced H.R. n87o, 11871, and II872,ss These bills define
"dominant economic power" to exist when in a line of commerce the four largest
firms account for fifty per cent or more of total sales, and make it unlawful to
possess or exercise such power when it may tend to lessen competition. H.R. ix870
would specifically make it unlawful for any two of the four firms "knowingly
to pursue a similar course of action." Also, in the Hearings before the Senate Sub-
committee on Antitrust and Monopoly last year,84 and which are soon to resume,
it is being seriously proposed that the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935
or a similar regulation be applied to large industrial firms, the object being to
dissolve such firms into independent units having the maximum size consistent
with efficiency. And in almost every session of Congress a bill is introduced
requiring that parties to all prospective mergers involving firms above a certain
size (for example, $ioo million in assets) notify the FTC 90 days prior to the date
of merger and/or seek FTC clearance before they proceed with the merger.
III
TiH IMPAcT OF THE NEw ANTITRUST ON BUSINESS FIRMS
The foregoing decisions and proposed legislation obviously add up to a sub-
stantial change in antitrust policy, a change that holds important implications for
corporate enterprise, big and small. It is now perfectly clear that the large corpora-
tion, confronting such doctrines as those laid down in Alcoa, Brown Shoe, Procter
& Gamble, Foremost Dairies, Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, and Penn-Olin must care-
fully select its means of growth. .The merger decisions could possibly be turned
against almost any expansion by large firms through acquisition, and Alcoa and
Penn-Olin limit the means and direction of internal growth. Pending legislation,
if enacted, would not only limit much more drastically the growth and size of
business firms in the future but would reduce the present size of many large
corporations.
In view of the contemporary corporation's propensity to expand through merger
it is clear that the-newly enunciated doctrines can significantly affect the conduct
of corporate affairs. Between 1951 and i961, the 500 largest industrial firms made
3,404 acquisitions, an average of 6.8 acquisitions per firm.85 Between 1948 and
1964, at least 72o manufacturing firms having assets of $io million and over, in total
87 th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).8
'Hearings on Economic Concentration Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust avd Monopoly of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., ist Sess. (1964).
"STAFF OF HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON SMALL BusiNESs, 87TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON
MERGERS AND SUPERCONCENTRATION-ACQUISITIONS OF 500 LARGEST INDUSTRIAL AND 50 LARGEST MER-
CHANDISING FIms 22-23 (Comm. Print x962).
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accounting for $23 billion in assets, were acquired by other firmsO6 The assets
acquired in the $io million-S25 million asset-size class represented 4o.3 per cent of
the total manufacturing assets in that size class in 1959. The corresponding pro-
portion of total assets acquired through merger for the $25 million-$5o million class
was 38.1 per cent; for the $5o million-Sioo million class, 26.7 per cent; for the $ioo
million-$25o million class, 14-.2 per cent; and for the over $25o million class, 0.5 per
cent 7  Stated in terms of simple members, every fifteen years or so about one-
quarter of all the manufacturing firms in the $5o million-$25o million asset-size class,
and nearly half of those falling in the $io million-$5o million asset-size class, are
merged with other manufacturing firms.3 8 Merger is clearly a frequent occurrence
among corporate enterprise, both as a means of growth and, since for every buyer
there is a seller, as a means of terminating independent corporate existence. While
these data serve amply to document the fact that industrial mergers still go on apace,
they also measure the extent to which corporate enterprise may have to alter their
business conduct in the future.
The new antitrust policy is not limited to future acquisitions. As former
Assistant Attorney General William Orrick has emphasized, those that have not
yet been challenged are subject to being challenged at any future time. As he
stated before the Antitrust Section of the ABA in 1964, "Surely there is nothing
revolutionary in the concept that earlier acquisitions may be questioned at a much
later date.' 3'9  He pointed to Standard Oil4" and DuPont-General Motors41 as ex-
amples from the past, and to pending cases against Monsanto, The Blue Chip Stamp
Co., Valley National Bank of Arizona, American Smelting and Refining Company,
Richfield Oil Company, and the Newmont Mining Corporation as examples in the
present 2 He could have included on the list the case now pending against General
Motors for its acquisition of Euclid in i953. ' Since it has been calculated that
most large corporations owe about one-third of their present size to past acquisitions
and mergers, it is clear that such corporations are potentially susceptible to dissolu-
tion under section 7 at any time. This vulnerability puts the present-day large
"See testimony of Willard F. Mueller, in Hearings, supra note 34, pt. 2, at 509.
8 Hearings, supra note 34, Pt. 2, at 512.
a Ibid.
Orrick, The Clayton Act: Then and Now (a paper presented at the program of the 1964, Spring
meeting, entitled "Fifty Years of the Federal Trade Commission and the Clayton Acts"), 24 ABA
ANTITRUST SEctIoN 44, 47 (1964).
'0 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. i (1911).
"'United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
"2 United States v. Mobay Chem. Co., Civil No. 64-342, W.D. Pa., filed April 14, 1964; United States
v. Blue Chip Stamp Co., Civil No. 63-1 5 52S, S.D. Cal., filed Dec. 26, 1963; United States v. Valley
Nat'l Bank, Civil No. 4550, D. Ariz., filed Dec. 28, 1962; United States v. American Smelting & Ref. Co.,
6o Civil 241, S.D.N.Y., filed Jan. 19, 1961; United States v. Richfield Oil Corp., Civil No. 62-1374,
S.D. Cal., filed Oct. 9, 1962; United States v. Newmont Mining Corp., Civil No. 4227, S.D.N.Y., filed
Dec. 31, 1962.
"
5 United States v. General Motors Corp., Civil No. 151-370, S.D.N.Y., filed Oct. 16, 1959.
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corporation in a much different position with respect to antitrust policy than its
predecessors.
The most significant impact of the more intensified antitrust policy, however,
must probably be measured in terms of its present and future effects on corporate
decisions concerning growth rather than in terms of specific acquisitions arrested
in specific litigations. Antitrust law, probably more than most law, has its principal
effect through compliance. The many open forums of the legal and economics
professions dedicated to "the current status of antitrust policy" keep the more alert
members of the business community, or at least their legal counsel, well informed
on what the statutes proscribe. The legal means of growth are known to have been
greatly restricted since the 1948 Columbia Steel decision in which the Supreme
Court stated that it could not keep U.S. Steel from acquiring through merger that
which it was perfectly free to construct for itself. It can be assumed that most large
corporations now make expansion plans under the known constraints the new anti-
trust policy imposes. The fact that the number of cases is still high only reflects
the fast moving pace at which the new doctrines have developed; most of the pend-
ing cases probably would not have materialized had the decisions on the "deep
pocket," "ultimate reckoning," and "foreclosure" doctrines been passed down earlier.
It is now reasonably clear that any horizontal merger involving eight to ten per
cent or more of a relevant line of commerce and that any vertical or "conglomerate"
acquisition by a large corporation of a small firm having small competitors is highly
vulnerable. Former Assistant Attorney General Orrick stated in a speech on May 12,
1964, that most important horizontal mergers may now be considered illegal per se.
Nor can the acquiring firm sustain its acquisition (i) by showing that the net effect
of the merger may be to increase competition, even though in a specific more nar-
rowly defined market competition may be lessened;44 (2) by showing that the
merger permits it more effectively to compete with a larger rival in a "dominant"
position; 45 or (3) that the merger promotes efficiency and is a normal response to
market and technological forces4 It is not as clear what mergers are legal, but
presumably mergers among small corporations and vertical and conglomerate acqui-
sitions by firms smaller than most of the acquired firm's rivals avoid most of the
recently developed doctrines.
The new doctrines raise important questions of public policy to which there
are no obvious answers. Thoughtful scholars and competent students of economic
policy have questioned the wisdom of providing aid and protection to small business
through the antitrust laws rather than the traditional small business institutions; the
wisdom of forbidding cost-reducing and technologically inspired mergers at such
"United States v. Philadelphia Nat'!Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (x963).
""United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
"United States v. Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. 294 (1962); Foremost Dairies, Inc., 6o F.T.C. 944
(1962).
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low levels of concentration as were involved in Brown Shoe and Foremost Dairies;
and the wisdom of choking off so many of the avenues of corporate growth only
a short decade ago regarded by the business community as routine.
On the other hand, the new antitrust policy seems to bid fair eventually to
reduce the level of over-all concentration as well as the level of concentration in
specific lines of commerce; both results have been regarded by many as desirable
since the enactment of the Sherman Act-this year celebrating its Diamond Anni-
versary. But more than this, the new policy will force individual corporations to
consider more seriously the alternatives to the acquisition of domestic companies as
means of company growth and product diversification. For the large corporation
on which antitrust policy has been turned, the logical alternative to such domestic
acquisitions is the acquisition of foreign companies, especially in western Europe.
In fact, in the six-year period 1958-63 United States manufacturing corporations estab-
lished at least 2,2oo "new operations" in Europe; since more than three-quarters
of the total were located in the European Common Market countries,4 ' they were
very likely made in response to the formation of the European Economic Community
rather than to the new legal prohibitions on domestic mergers and acquisitions. The
total represents a sample of both newly established and acquired facilities. Acquisi-
tions are not shown separately and are not identified by acquiring firms, but the data
suggest that the larger United States corporations probably acquired more foreign
than domestic firms during this period. Market-extension and product-extension
acquisitions in Europe may run counter to the economic objectives of President de
Gaulle, but it is doubtful that in the immediate future they will be found in con-
travention of section 7-
The more stringent new section 7 doctrines will also require that large corpora-
tions substitute new plant construction for some acquisitions they would otherwise
make. Indeed, this will very likely be socially the most beneficial effect of the
new antitrust policy. Generally, all other things remaining the same, large firms
will grow more rapidly when permitted to acquire going establishments than if this
avenue of growth is denied them, since product extension through construction of
new plants involves greater risks and higher orders of uncertainty than the acquisition
of going organizations. On the other hand, new plant construction comprises a net
addition to the economy's total productive capacity whereas an acquisition, at least
in the initial instance, simply transfers the ownership of existing capacity. How-
ever, the ultimate effect of a more stringent ban on acquisition cannot be so easily
predicted; when large corporations make acquisitions they generally expand the
acquired firm's capacity through new plant construction. Hence, a vigorous anti-
merger policy encourages the substitution of some new plant construction for
acquisition and at the same time discourages new plant additions to acquired firms.
' THE C.SE TdA rATTAN BANK. REPORT ON W.ErERN EuRoPE, No. 28 (Feb.-March 1964).
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The economic calculus is clearly not capable of predicting the economic impact
of our new antitrust policy with any high order of precision. The new doctrines
have been laid down so rapidly and so recently that they have not perceptibly
affected the principal economic indicators to which they are related-not even the
indexes of over-all merger activity. Yet it is clear that they hold significant impli-
cations for the future conduct of the economic affairs of large corporations and will,
unless reversed, force the large multiproduct corporation to explore new alternatives
to merger and acquisition. The big issue, of course, is what logically should be the
specific objectives of antitrust policy and at what price should they be bought.
This question is not likely to be resolved in this the seventy-fifth year of United
States antitrust policy-or even by next year.
